

Tod's delisting aided by L Catterton (owned by LVMH) of €1.4 billion

ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS

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LVMH



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Deal Introduction

DETAILS ABOUT THE DEAL

On 10th February 2024, it was announced that Italian luxury bag and shoemaker brand Tod's is going to be delisted from the Milan stock exchange and taken private by LVMH-backed private equity firm L Catterton.

Minority shares were bought for €43 each, a 18% premium on the closing value of Tod's shares on 9th February 2024, for its 36% stake of the company, totalling out to €512m. This gave Tod's a valuation of around €1.4bn excluding €800m debt. The Della Valle family, current owner of Tod's, will retain a 54% t majority stake while LVMH will retain a 10% stake in the company.

Tod's was advised by JP Morgan Chase & Co, while L Catterton was advised by Bank of America.

J.P.Morgan Bankof America



REASONS FOR M&A

Tod's, famous for its leather driving loafers, has been striving to stay relevant in the luxury industry which is rapidly evolving with larger companies dominating the market. Albeit Tod's sales reaching €1.12 billion in 2023, up 11.9 per cent year-on-year, it is still far behind conglomerates with likes of LVMH or Kering. The company has faced years of underperformance, with its stock reaching a record low of €18.08 in October 2020, down 87.2% from its peak of €141.10 in August 2013. Since 2017, the company has attempted to revitalize its sales by altering its management and strategy without success. It was also hit particularly hard by the Covid-19 pandemic. One reason addressed by Diego Della Valle is the company's inability to target millennials due to the brand's persist on using high-quality raw material such as hide. He believed that the delisting would allow the company to focus on investments in marketing and R&D to tackle said problem and improve sales revenue.

Tod's management also believes that privatizing the company will enable quicker decision-making and provide increased flexibility to pursue growth opportunities. Indeed, in 2022, the Della Valle family attempted to acquire the minority stakes in Tod's but fell short of securing the required 90% shareholder support. They also made an unsuccessful attempt to merge Tod's with the family-owned DeVa finance firm. The lack of shareholder support led to the failures, and if the family had persisted with the acquisition or merger, it would have been viewed as hostile. While the family will maintain a 54% stake, L Catterton acquired 10.5% of the 36% stake from Diego Della Valle, resulting in him receiving just under €149.4 million from the deal.

It is likely that the delisting could help improve Tod's performance as L Catterton has restructuring experience and specialises in consumer brands as demonstrated by the turnaround of Birkenstock with a listing of \$8.6bn in October 2023. LVMH has a rich tradition of investing in Tod's given Diego Della Valle friendship with Bernard Arnault, founder of LVMH, initially acquiring a stake in 2000 and more recently securing a 6.8 percent stake in 2021, culminating in a total of 10 percent before the delisting. The delisting may be viewed as LVMH positioning itself to potentially acquire the brand, aligning with its strategy of acquiring established brands, as demonstrated by its purchases of Bulgari in 2011 and Loro Piana in 2013.



Industry Overview

The Luxury Goods Industry is composed by a plethora of different goods and services, ranging from gastronomy, cosmetics, travel, and, most notably clothing. The essence of the Luxury Industry is characterized by exclusivity, quality, and rarity. The most important player in the industry is the LVMH Group, owner of numerous brands, including: Louis Vuitton, Bulgari, TAG Heuer, and many more.

Industry challenges

According to a report by Bain & Company from last November, the Luxury Goods Industry was expected to reach €1.5 trillion by the end of 2023 at a growth rate of 8-10% over 2022.


Amidst macroeconomic tensions and conditions, Luxury was able to grow consistently during 2023, although numerous potential setbacks ahead in 2024.


In fact, the so-called "revenge spending" that characterized the surge in American consumer spending following the end of COVID-19 restrictions is long gone, and the expectations of a similar increase in aggregate spending in China, following the country's long-awaited opening after the zero covid policies, was also disappointing for investors. In fact, nononly did China underperform its own GDP growth expectations, but also the country's stock market slowed down considerably, as instead the Japanese Nikkei continues to surprise investors with new rallies and records after 30 years of stagnation. China's "setbacks" matter as in fact in the last 2 decades the country's disposable income dramatically increased, and the same did its market share of spending in the luxury industry, going from an estimated 11% in 2019 to a projected 27% in 2025. China is still expected to increase its market share in consumption in the coming years, but this could come to a slow down given the potential erosion in the consumers' disposable income.




Connected to the importance of Chinese consumers for the world's Luxury Industry, it is the blockade of the Aden Strait between Yemen and Africa, where, at its narrowest point, is only 30 kilometers wide. Chinese consumers do not merely shop in European Fashion cities like Milan and Paris, but often in their local European Luxury Stores and therefore, the impossibility of commercial ships to pass through the fastest route between Asia and Europe consists in a considerable disruption of the supply chain of raw materials and final goods.

Personal Luxury Goods Market by Region (EUR B | 2019-2025F)









American, European and Japanese Outlook

The U.S. has seen a deceleration in consumer spending in 2022, leading to an approximate drop of 8%. On the other hand, Europe, which saw its market share deteriorating since the democratization of luxury around the world, seems to be benefitting by increasing number of tourists to the continent. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, economically Japan is preforming soundly, and in the same manner, local consumers, a weak Yen and increasing tourism have favored the luxury industry as well.



Acquirer Overview



L Catterton (formerly Catterton Partners Corporation) is a private equity firm founded in 1989, with \$38bn assets under management and headquartered in Connecticut United States. The firm invests in the consumer industry focusing on food and beverages, retail and restaurants, consumer products and services investing typically \$100 to \$1000m.

The L Catterton rebranding was created in 2016 in a merger with LVMH Bernard Arnault's family office creating a diversified consumer-dedicated private equity firm.

The firm seeks to invest in companies based in North America, Western Europe and Asia.

L Catterton's investment philosophy focuses on collaboration with management teams, focusing on mid-market companies, emphasising a hands-on approach to their portfolio companies.



MANAGEMENT, NOTABLE INVESTMENTS AND RECENTS EXITS

Senior Management:

- Bernard Arnault (Chairman)
- J. Michael Chu (Co-Founder and Co-CEO)
- Scott Arnold Dahnke (Global Co-CEO)
- Narayan Ramachandran (Vice Chairman)
- Annie Kyprianou (CFO)

Notable investments:

- A.P.C (Clothing) in March 2023 for an undisclosed amount
- Freshly (Restaurant) in November 2022 for an undisclosed amount
- Etro (Clothing) in Jul 2023 for \$365.1m
- Birkenstock (Footwear) in Apr 2021 for \$4.8bn
- Savage x Fenty (Feb 2021): \$155m series B fundraising round
- Honest Company (Jun 2018): \$200m minority investment in Jessica Alba's co-funded company

Recent Exits:

- Birkenstock (Oct 2023) IPO for \$1.5bn
- Sale of Antony's coal fired pizza (Nov 2021) for \$156.6m
- Reverse merger of Cazoo Group (Aug 2021) for \$805.0m





CAZOO





Target Overview



Tod's is a renowned Italian luxury fashion house established in 1900. Their expertise lies in crafting footwear, apparel, and accessories, with a focus on timeless elegance and superior quality. The company, headquartered in Marche, Italy, is known for its iconic driving shoes, featuring a pebbled leather sole and a signature rubber pebble on the heel.

For over a century, Tod's has remained a family-owned business, with the Della Valle family actively involved for three generations. This dedication to heritage and tradition is evident in their meticulous craftsmanship and use of premium materials. Tod's products have garnered a loyal following amongst celebrities and discerning individuals who appreciate the brand's unwavering commitment to quality and timeless style.

Tod's pursued its Initial Public Offering (IPO) on November 6th, 2000. Ever since then, the company saw its revenues and profits grow to reach a current Market Capitalization of €1.42bn and revenue figures of €1'106m as of 2023. Mr. Diego Della Valle is in talks to sell a 36% stake to L Catterton for EUR 512 million as of February 10, 2024. The transaction values the company at an estimated EUR 1.4 billion. As part of the transaction, the company will go private. J.P. Morgan has advised on the deal.



LBO Analysis

LBO MODEL - ENTRY AND EXIT ASSUMPTIONS

| Entry Valuation | | Exit Assumptions | |
|------------------|---------|------------------|-------|
| Entry EBITDA | 206.022 | Exit Date | 2028 |
| EBITDA Multiple | 1,18x | Exit Multiple | 2,50x |
| Entry EV | 242.261 | Exit Fees | - |
| EV/Revenue 2022A | 0,24x | | |
| EV/Revenue 2023E | 0,21x | | |
| EV/EBITDA 2022A | 1,18x | | |
| EV/EBITDA 2023E | 1,65x | | |
| | | 1 | |

Based on historical financial results, the entry multiple for the LBO model was **1.18x**. Exit multiple for 2028 assumed to be **2.50x.**

CAPITALIZATION TABLE - PRE AND POST TRANSACTION

| Cap Table Summary | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|---------|----------------|--------|--------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | Pre-trx | Post-trx | | | | | | | |
| | | % prefs % ords | | | | | | | |
| Della Valle Family | 50. | .9% | 54.0% | 0.0% | | | | | |
| L Catterton | 6. | .5% | 36.0% | 0.0% | | | | | |
| LVMH | 10. | .0% | 10.0% | 100.0% | | | | | |
| Other Equity holders | 32. | .6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | | | | | |
| Total | 100. | .0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | | | | | |
| 1 | | | | | | | | | |

Pre-transaction, the majority stakeholders of Tod's was the Della Valle Family, controlling 50,9% of shares. 6,5% was owned by L Catterton.

Post-transaction, L Catterton increased their ownership to 36%, however, the controlling stake of Tod's still under the ownership of the Della Valle Family.



FINANCIAL FORECAST

| | <u> </u> | | | | 0 0 0 0 | | <u> </u> | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|-----------|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|
| _ | | Actuals | | Forecast | Operating Case | | | CAGR | 10,02% | | |
| EURmm | 2020A | 2021A | 2022A | 2023FC | 2024P | 2025P | 2026P | 2027P | 2028P | 20-'22 | 22-'28 |
| P&L | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total revenue | 647.043 | 900.361 | 1.027.065 | 1.129.977 | 1.243.201 | 1.367.769 | 1.504.820 | 1.655.603 | 1.821.494 | 16,65% | 10,02% |
| % growth | | 39,15% | 14,07% | 10,02% | 10,02% | 10,02% | 10,02% | 10,02% | 10,02% | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total COGS | 637.639 | 743.204 | 821.043 | 983.202 | 1.033.915 | 1.140.341 | 1.271.817 | 1.385.486 | 1.527.464 | 8,79% | 9,21% |
| % of revenue | 98,55% | 82,55% | 79,94% | 87,01% | 83,17% | 83,37% | 84,52% | 83,68% | 83,86% | | |
| & growth | | 14,20% | 9,48% | 16,49% | 4,90% | 9,33% | 10,34% | 8,20% | 9,30% | | |
| | 647.043 | | | | | | | | | | |
| EBIT | (135.362) | 24.157 | 58.228 | (2.138) | 58.692 | 73.865 | 79.917 | 118.277 | 144.840 | -24,51% | 332,36% |
| % EBIT margin | 20,92% | 2,68% | 5,67% | -0,19% | 4,72% | 5,40% | 5,31% | 7,14% | 7,95% | | |
| Depreciation & Amortization | 144.766 | 133.000 | 147.794 | 148.913 | 150.594 | 153.563 | 153.086 | 151.839 | 149.190 | 0,69% | 0,04% |
| % D&A margin | 22,37% | 14,77% | 14,39% | 13,18% | 12,11% | 11,23% | 10,17% | 9,17% | 8,19% | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| EBITDA | 9.404 | 157.157 | 206.022 | 146.775 | 209.286 | 227.428 | 233.003 | 270.116 | 294.030 | 179,81% | 14,91% |
| % EBITDA margin | 1,45% | 17,45% | 20,06% | 12,99% | 16,83% | 16,63% | 15,48% | 16,32% | 16,14% | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pretax Income | (157.975) | 2.471 | 29.036 | 103.643 | 100.590 | 146.308 | 185.395 | 204.788 | 214.853 | -43,14% | 15,70% |
| % margin | 24,41% | 0,27% | 2,83% | 9,17% | 8,09% | 10,70% | 12,32% | 12,37% | 11,80% | | |
| Net Income | (73.190) | (5.938) | 23.065 | (31.663) | 427 | (2.380) | (14.756) | (6.182) | (9.277) | -31,95% | -21,77% |
| % margin | -11,31% | 0,66% | 2,25% | -2,80% | 0,03% | -0,17% | -0,98% | -0,37% | -0,51% | | |
| +D&A | 144.766 | 133.000 | 147.794 | 148.913 | 150.594 | 153.563 | 153.086 | 151.839 | 149.190 | 0,69% | 0,04% |
| -Capex | 30.267 | 44.933 | 45.845 | 53.222 | 58.679 | 63.328 | 70.526 | 77.464 | 84.976 | 14,84% | 9,81% |
| -Change in NWC | | 71939 | -37924 | 17008 | -10458 | 3275 | 10141 | 986 | 4801 | | |
| UFCF | | 10.190 | 162.938 | 47.021 | 102.801 | 84.581 | 57.663 | 67.208 | 50.136 | | 1,29% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |

Revenue growth is assumed to be 10.02% for the projected period. EBITDA margin standing at around 16% on FY2028P, implying a EV of £1,187.69mm.

FORECASTS

| | Actuals | | | Forecast | Operating Case | | | | |
|---|----------|----------|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------|-------------------|----------|------------|
| EURmm | 2020A | 2021A | 2022A | 2023FC | 2024P | 2025P | 2026P | 2027P | 2028P |
| Projections | | | | | | | | | |
| Capital Expenditures % of Revenue | 4,68% | 4,99% | 4,46% | 4,71% | 4,72% | 4,63% | 4,69% | 4,68% | 4,67% |
| Change in NWC | | 71.939 | (37.924) | 17.008 | (10.458) | 3.275 | 10.141 | 986 | 4.801 |
| CapEx | 30.267 | 44.933 | 45.845 | 53.222 | 58.679 | 63.328 | 70.526 | 77.464 | 84.976 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| EURmm | 2021H | 2021F | HY as % of FY | 2022 H | 2022F | HY as % of FY | Avg HY as % of FY | 2023 H | 2023 F FC |
| Projections | | | | | | | | | |
| Revenue | 405.056 | 900.361 | 44,99% | 476.031 | 1.027.065 | 46,35% | 45,67% | 575.958 | 1.261.173 |
| COGS (purchases - change in inventory + personnel costs) | -210.274 | -339.788 | 61,88% | -212.477 | -440.731 | 48,21% | 55,05% | -219.643 | -399.010 |
| Depreciation/Amortization | -67.624 | -133.000 | 50,85% | -72.887 | -147.794 | 49,32% | 50,08% | -78.477 | -156.701 |
| Total Operating Costs | -407.716 | -876.205 | 46,53% | -458.355 | -968.837 | 47,31% | 46,92% | -515.617 | -1.098.906 |
| EBIT | -2.660 | 24.156 | -11,01% | 17.677 | 58.228 | 30,36% | 30,00% | 60.342 | 201.140 |
| Net Interest Expense | -11.206 | -21.685 | 51,68% | -9.615 | -29.192 | 32,94% | 42,31% | -13.902 | -32.860 |
| EBT | -13.866 | 2.471 | -561,15% | 8.062 | 29.036 | 27,77% | -266,69% | 46.440 | -17.413 |
| Income Taxes | -6.862 | -8.409 | 81,60% | -7.307 | -5.971 | 122,37% | 101,99% | -15.491 | -15.189 |

Analysis of seasonal revenue was conducted to forecast the expected FY growth for 2023FC. CapEx is forecasted to be a stable 4.6% of revenue.



RETURNS ANALYSIS

| Return Analysis | 2023 | 3A 2 | 2024A | 2025A | 2026A | 2027A | 2028A |
|---------------------|--------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----------|
| Equity Contribution | | 206.022 | | | - | - | |
| Dividends | | - | | | - | - | |
| Preference Shares | | - | | | - | - | |
| Ordinary Shares | | - | - | | - | - | |
| Total Cash Flows | (2 | 206.022) | - | | - | - | - 735.075 |
| IRR | 28,97% | | | | | | |
| MOIC | 3,57x | | | | | | |

Please click on the table to access the full model

Equity contribution for acquisition amounted to £206mm. Exit EV of £735.075mm, with a corresponding an IRR of 28.97% and a MOIC of 3.57x.



Deal Analysis

STRENGTHS

- Pursuant to this deal, the Dalla Valle family would retain majority control at 54%, which is important as the family also leads the creative direction of the firm.
- Tod's has made efforts to improve its financial position in the past years, as its financial statements indicate, which makes it better positioned to pursue this decision in comparison to its 2022 standing.
- Tod's gains a strong strategic partner with extensive experience in the luxury industry. Furthermore, at a time when the Chinese luxury market is booming, association with the LVMH brand is important from a tactical growth perspective.

OPPORTUNITIES

- The delisting would allow the Della Valle family to achieve long-term objectives which are made "more difficult" by its public status and the dilution of control. The family has ambitions to "turn the company around" in light of waning earnings in the past years. In fashion and more artistic sectors, obligations of disclosure and overexposure to the whims of the public market can serve as a barrier to the creative integrity and evolution of a company.
- It goes without saying that a partnership with LVMH and L Catterton could provide the firm with extra capital to pursue several important strategic objectives. It is important for Tod's to leverage these resources especially as it aims to take advantage of growing markets (China specifically).



WEAKNESSES

- Tod's first attempt to delist in 2022 failed because the first offer was too low; in the face of the firm's waning popularity and worn-through profitability, can it truly afford to take this path and does this give it the resources to pursue its turnaround without compromising its independence?
- It is worth considering that, ignoring recent surges in share price related to this deal, Tod's stock has around 10% traded below its 2000 IPO price in the past few years, with efforts to improve the product line and increase the bottom line not being appreciated by investors.
- The price offered by L Catterton represents a 17.6% premium to the closing price on February 9th. At 43 EUR per share, however, it is hardly a significant premium considering the fact that it hardly beats the original IPO price. Additionally, the offer is just a 1.7x multiple of revenues (compare this with Birkenstock's 5.5x). In essence, the valuation of the company seems to have changed very little since its listing.

THREATS

 This deal can also be understood as a consolidation of LVMH's position in the industry, as it will effectively enlarge its stake in the business, which raises further questions about industry concentration. It is posited that this move is little more than an intermediary step on the path to a complete takeover by LVMH - essentially a way to sell minority shareholders short in anticipation of a larger payout by LVMH.

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GLOSSARY

Asset Turnover Ratio: The ratio indicates the efficiency of a firm to use its assets to generate revenue - calculated by dividing revenue by the total assets of a firm.

Capitalization Table: Breakdown of the company's ownership. It serves to show the pre and post transaction change in the composition of the equity in the company.

Current Ratio: The current ratio shows the ability of a firm to cover their short term obligations (liabilities) with their short-term assets - calculated by dividing current assets with current liabilities.

Net Working Capital: The difference between operating assets and operating liabilities.

Senior Notes: Debt that a firm issues which has the most priority to be paid back in the case of a bankruptcy.

Sweet Equity: any form of non-monetary equity that owners/managers of a company contribute to the business.

Terminal Growth Rate: Assumption of the rate that a company is expected to grow forever.

WACC: Cost of capital used to represent a firm's after-tax costs from all resources.



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